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I desire of the philosophers to grant, that there
is in some (I believe in many) human breasts, a kind and
benevolent disposition, which is gratified by contributing
to the happiness of others. That in this gratification
alone, as in friendship, in parental and filial affection,
and indeed in general philanthropy, there is a great and
exquisite delight. That if we will not call such disposition
love, we have no name for it.

--Henry Fielding
"On the Knowledge of the Characters
of Men"
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis originated in a dawning recognition I experienced while
reading the works of the existentialist psychologist Viktor Frankl, founder
of a psychotherapeutic approach he calls existential analysis or "logotherapy.
Logotherapy, as its name suggests, is a theory and a method centrally concerned
with the meaning of life for different individuals. Frankl's thesis is that
people do not simply seek satisfaction of their biological needs and psychological
drives or instincts, they also need meaning: not just survival but something
to live for; not absence of suffering but a way to make something out of one's
suffering, and out of oneself through one's suffering. Frankl argues that this
"dimension" of meaning has been largely excluded from modern psychological
theories, resulting in a conception of human nature that he sees as a potentially
destructive caricature.
In the course of developing this view, Frankl directs much of his
critical scrutiny at Freud.

Drawing on the work of phenomenologist philosophers,

in particular Max Scheler, Frankl develops a general critique of reductionism
in psychology.

He uses this as a context for questioning theories of human

motivation, such as Freud's, that are based on notions of drives and stimulus
reduction derived originally from studies in animal psychology.

In particular,

Frankl criticizes the assumption that the desire for a certain inner state—
"pleasure" or reduction of tension—is the true source of any action, no
matter what its apparent object.

For such a notion if considered to apply

universally (Frankl does not deny that such a description would often apply)
would destroy meaning as Frankl understands it. For him meaning involves
valuing people and things as ends in themselves, not as means to achieving
an underlying goal such as reduction of tension.

<
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The recognition I experienced involved a growing awareness that this
all sounded extremely familiar.

It echoed to a startling extent the arguments

of an eighteenth century moral philosopher and theologian, Joseph Butler,
Bishop of Durham (1692-1752), whose debate with the egoist philosophers
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Bernard Mandeville (c. 1697-1733) Frank! seemed
to be directly continuing.

It seemed to me that while eighteenth century moral

philosophy is not the tradition on which Frank! specifically draws, it is to
the theory of philosophical egoism which was canvassed in that setting that
his opposition is really addressed.

This theory states, as formulated by a

modern student of the period, that "all men are wholly selfish all the time;
or that no man ever acts save for the sake of some future state of his own
(mental or physical) person."

2

While the Freudian pleasure principle figures prominently in Frankl's
work as a foil for elaboration of his own position, it is the theory of
philosophical egoism with which his criticisms really connect.

The question

of how centrally or consistently Freud was committed to that theory is not
considered by him in any thorough way.

Accordingly it seemed to me that the

eighteenth century anti-egoist writers, especially Butler, might provide
valuable insights applicable to Frankl's contemporary discussion. Exploration
of these contributions constitutes the heart of my paper, to be found in
Section IV.
The rest of the paper evolved out of considering some more general
aspects of the relevance of philosophy to psychology, of which my main
discussion constitutes in a sense a case study.

In Section I, I have presented

some general considerations about the special nature of philosophical questions,
and their often undetected presence in other, apparently more technical or

■
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empirical, fields of study. There is a vast literature on these issues, and
I have not attempted to do justice to all sides and all versions of the
arguments.

Drawing on the philosophy of science of the modern philosopher

Joseph Agassi, I suggest that scientific fields tend to contain both
1) unexamined philosophical assumptions and 2) an implicit philosophy of
science, which has been called naive empiricism

and more recently logical

positivism, denying that any philosophical assumptions are being made.

Insofar

as psychology has developed in a scientific context, especially within the
medical field of psychiatry, considerations about the relevance of philosophy
to science in general form a background for the recognition of philosophical
issues, and also of naive empiricist assumptions, in psychology.
Section II examines Frankl's elucidation of some philosophical issues
in psychology that he thinks have been too much ignored.

His claim that

"every school of psychotherapy has a concept of man, although this concept is
3
not always held consciously" is contrasted with Freud's position that the
Weltanschauung of psychoanalytic thought is simply that of science.

I explore

Frankl's objections to reductionism, and the "dimensional ontology" that he
proposes, instead, in order to reconcile different levels of explanation in
psychology.

Debates over reductionism continue fiercely in almost every

field, and here again I have confined myself to drawing selectively on points
I found useful.
In Section III two arguments Frank! brings to bear on the thesis that
pleasure is the only real object of desire are presented: 1) Direct pursuit
of pleasure is, as a practical matter, self-defeating, and is observed only
in pathological (neurotic) states.

2) A theory of motivation based on instincts

and the striving to maintain homeostasis denies any real involvement of
an individual with the outside world, postulating a sort of motivational

'
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solipsism inconsistent with the search for meaning.

This second point is

the one Frankl attaches most importance to; and it is, as I have suggested
above, not so much a point against the Freudian pleasure principle as a point
against philosophical egoism.
Philosophical egoism as a theory is described in Section IV, with
examples from Hobbes and Mandeville.

Much of the section is devoted to

developing in detail Butler's supposed refutation of egoism, which turns out
to be a refutation not of the theory as such, but of one influential a priori
argument for the theory.

This argument represents the egoist thesis as

necessarily or logically true.
are desires of mine;
also mine;

Briefly, this argument runs: All my desires

The satisfaction I will get from fulfilling them is

Therefore I am really acting, whatever the circumstances, to secure

my own satisfaction; And this entails that it is my own well-being, rather
than anyone else's or anything else, to which I am entirely devoted.
Butler's reply really dismantles this argument, for he points out that
in the middle of it a shift is made between two very different concepts of
self-interest.

The sense in which all actions and motives are to be considered

self-interested simply because they belong to the self, applies equally to the
whole spectrum of actions from rapacious to generous, resentful to magnanimous,
cruel to compassionate.

This is an important and real form of egoism, as we

can learn from the many spiritual disciplines which aim at extinguishing or
transforming desire in just this sense.4

But it is a different form of egoism

from the one recognized in colloquial distinctions between "selfish" and
"unselfish" deeds.

Recognition that all actions are selfish in the first

sense might have many possible consequences, but it does not justify the
conclusion that all apparently unselfish actions can be known, a priori, to
be in fact selfish in the second, colloquial sense.

In particular, recognition

5

of the pervasiveness of selfishness in the first sense gives no support to
the presumption that behind every action of an apparently disinterested or
unselfish kind lies a specifiable ulterior motive aiming directly at some
kind of pleasure or satisfaction for the agent.
Many of the examples offered by Hobbes and Mandeville rely on exactly
this unsound conclusion, for example, Hobbes' celebrated definition of pity
as fear for ourselves occasioned by the sight of the misfortune of another.
The importance of Butler's demonstration that the general argument is flawed
is that it deprives the specific examples of a compelling logical backing,
without which they face a requirement to be individually plausible and
convincing that they often do not meet.
I maintain that this flawed general argument, which seems to establish
the conclusions of philosophical egoism as logically inescapable, lends a sort
of atmosphere of obviousness to assumptions made in motivation theory that are
actually far from obvious.

And these are the assumptions that Frankl is, first,

bringing to light and, second, trying to dispute.

I think that the motivational

solipsism of philosophical egoism, like epistemological solipsism (the view
that there is no reason to believe in the existence of any consciousness but
my own) cannot be formally refuted. But many new kinds of questioning are
opened up by recognizing that it is not the uncontroversial finding of common
sense that it might at first appear to be.
The last section, Section V, on philosophy and psychology, considers the
question of how the concerns of moralists can have importance for psychologists
not interested in making moral judgments as such.
Freud's extremely powerful

A link is found through

thesis that a person may be unconscious of many

or most of his/her motives, with the resulting search for motives which are
hidden.

A philosophical theory such as philosophical egoism, with its outright

'
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equation of true motive with selfish motive (in the stronger sense), can be
influential or determinative in guiding that search.

The psychological

theory, widely accepted by many who depart from Freud in other ways, and well
established in our popular culture, tells us that we need to probe for nonobvious underlying purposes; a philosophical theory may tell us what we
should expect these to look like when we find them.

Philosophical egoism tells

us that only a selfish motive is even a candidate to be considered a true
motive.

Hence it seems obvious—though it is not, from the point of view of

Butler's critique of the logical backing of the theory—that motives other than
those Freud called instinctual should be passed over in this search and
regarded as derivative.
Ultimately Frankl's argument with Freud concerns where the search for
explanation should stop, in considering human motives. Frankl's contention
that it should stop when it reaches something "authentic" and "truly human"
must be considered uninformative.

But his challenge locates freedom and

responsibility not only with patients but also with psychologists.

He suggests

that we are required to make decisions about what concerns we are prepared to
recognize as "authentic"; these decisions have a philosophical and perhaps also
a moral basis.

He does not supply us with guiding principles for making these

decisions, but only with a warning against uncritically accepting guiding
principles that are too restrictive, especially those derived from heuristic
theoretical simplifications, in reductionist psychological theories, that have
been made and then forgotten.

7

I.

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: PERSISTING BACONIAN DICHOTOMIES AND
THE ROLE OF THEORY

Philosophy is often characterized as a field in which no progress is
made, no results are achieved, and the same questions are discussed for
millenia without seeming even to come closer to being solved. Certainly the
question of philosophical egoism falls in this category, as proponents and
opponents of egoist views can be found in every era, at least as far back as
the ancient Greeks. Other such questions have traditionally included such
topics as the relation of mind and matter, the capacity of human thinking to
attain to truth, the nature of knowledge, free will and determinism, and
the potential for good and evil in human nature.

Since we evidently manage

to get along in the absence of consensus on these matters, and even in the
absence of consensus about what the questions really mean and how they should
be formulated, it might seem that we do not really need to answer them or
even to concern ourselves with them at all.

This view receives some support

from the attitudes of many modern philosophers themselves. The English moral
philosopher C. D. Broad, for example, wrote at the end of his classic book
Five Types of Ethical Theory that in his view ethical theory is of no
importance to anyone but ethical theorists, and that, fortunately for us
all, the actual moral life of mankind is conducted without reference to
the changing fashions in that specialized branch of academic entertainment.^
At the opposite extreme is the view of Viktor Frankl, that prevalent opinions
on philosophical questions shape events very directly. Frankl, whose work
was significantly shaped by his observations and experiences as a concentration
camp prisoner, has said, "In any case, I believe it to be a straight path
from [the] homunculist image of man to the gas chambers of Auschwitz,
Treblinka, and Maidenek."6

And in the same vein, he writes.

'
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This pathology [the pathology of the Zeitgeist], if one could
describe it, is marked by provisional, fatalistic, conformist,
and fanatic attitudes to life which can easily mount to the
proportions of a psychic epidemic. Somatic epidemics are typical
results of war; psychic epidemics ar^ possible causes of war,
and thus of new concentration camps/
Academic philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world, has
been occupied increasingly with discussion of the nature of philosophy
itself.

Philosophers have been occupied with a sort of second-order or

metaphilosophical questioning about what questions philosophers should be
asking, and what sorts of answers they can expect to find.

This is an

ancient theme with a lineage reaching back at least to Socrates; however, the
modern preoccupation with it is distinctively shaped by an intellectual
setting in which "scientific" and "rational" tend to be readily equated, and
philosophy is somewhat on the defensive.

Different schools of philosophy,

such as the analytic and the phenomenological, are defined fundamentally by
their different interests and methods.

Starting from different conceptions of

the nature of philosophy, they hardly intersect enough to offer differing
views on the same issues.
Discussions of the nature of philosophy have involved efforts to
understand what gives traditional philosophical questions, such as those
about mind and matter, free will and determinism--often referred to as
"metaphysical" questions-- their persistent and unresolvable character.

Many

attempts have been made to trace this to some flaw or underlying incoherence
in the questions themselves.

This was the approach of Kant and more recently,

in a very different way, of Wittgenstein.

Frank! follows Spinoza in

suggesting that the flaws in the questions are not isolated, but rather
reveal contradictions or problems in our habitual ways of thinking which
require more than intellectual effort to overcome.

For example, he views

questions about how mind and matter can "interact" as unanswerable because

.
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it is an illusion to regard them, as we do in framing this question and
also in our everyday experience, as separate.
The group of early twentieth century philosophers of science known as
Q

the logical positivists

maintained that all metaphysical questions and

statements are "meaningless," only seeming to have meaning because they are
cast in familiar grammatical forms.

This in turn was based on an attempt

to equate "meaning" with "method of verification": metaphysical statements
have no meaning because they have no method of verification. That is, they
are so broad that any and all observations can be construed as consistent
with them.

An example of a hypothesis of this type, that would be impossible

to verify, is the nineteenth century anti-evolutionist view that the world
was created as described in the Bible all at once, containing a fossil record,
and other misleading evidence suggesting a long period of gradual change,in
order to test our faith. This theory is by design compatible with all the
phenomena adduced as evidence for the opposite view, so it cannot be verified.
Another example would be the hypothesis that everything is shrinking and
expanding regularly at exactly the same rate; there would be no way to observe
this, since measuring implements would be shrinking and expanding too.*®
Verification itself proved difficult to define rigorously, a problem
that Sir Karl Popper addressed in his philosophy of science by shifting the
emphasis from verification to falsification.

In his view a statement is

meaningful, or scientific, only if there are conditions for its falsification
that can be specified, that is, if it is not compatible with all possible
observations.

In his view a theory is metaphysical, and thereby unscientific,

if it cannot in principle be falsified.

Popper bases his opposition to both

Freud and Marx on identifying such a "self-sealing" character in their
arguments.

He feels that both these systems of thought have built-in devices

10
for automatically transforming all proposed counterexamples and criticisms
into further evidence supporting their views.

This would apply, for example,

to the explaining away of all opposition to psychoanalysis as "resistance.
Joseph Agassi, a former student of Popper, has attempted to reinstate
metaphysics by arguing that it may play a legitimate and valuable role in
generating scientific hypotheses.

Popper's conception of science as

"conjectures and refutations" opened the way for this by allowing that a
scientific hypothesis is not marked by the special method by which it is
found: according to his scheme, Kekule's dream of the structure of the benzene
ring, for example, is as good a source of a scientific hypothesis as any
other, provided the hypothesis can be tested. Popper leaves open the question
of how we are to decide which hypotheses are worth bothering to test, since
time and resources are not available to test them all.

In practice, this does

seem to have something to do with how they were arrived at, and by whom (Kekule
was, after all, an organic chemist), though the theoretical issue remains
unsolved.

In any case, Popper left room for Agassi to suggest a role for

metaphysics in generating scientific hypotheses, and in providing overarching
frameworks or regulating principles which cannot themselves be tested but which
have consequences that can. These regulating conceptions may also help to
orient our judgment about which hypotheses are worth testing.

Agassi is not

worried about the question of how the "right" regulating principles are to be
chosen, lacking formal criteria for establishing their truth, for he is a
pluralist and believes work should proceed along many lines at once, with
fruitful discussion of differences. His name for this is "methodological
tolerance."^
Agassi points out that our intellectual climate, especially our thinking
about science and its relation to philosophy, is strongly influenced by a
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dichotomy between speculation and empirical investigation, inherited from
Francis Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science.

Speculation figures in

this scheme as the enemy of the true scientific attitude; for Bacon it
represented a heinous moral, as well as intellectual fault. Agassi says,
Almost every classical or contemporary history of science
bears the stamp of Francis Bacon's philosophy of science. Bacon's
philosophy divides thinkers into two categories variously
characterised as right and wrong, scientific and superstitious,
open-minded and dogmatic, observer of facts and speculant. The
open-minded person, according to this view, can observe and
record facts as they are, as they appear to his eyes accidentally;
he does not form any opinion until significant facts lead him to
a sound--i.e., scientific-judgment. The prejudiced and
superstitious person, on the other hand, starts by speculating,
by conjuring a hypothesis, and so sees the world as in a distorting
mirror. As he sees only the distorted image of the facts which
refute his theory, he is in no position to correct his views by
bringing them into accord with these facts; and since he can never
see that he has made a mistake, he will continue to see facts
distorted. Thus trapped by a vicious circle inside his distorting
view, he will be unable to avoid adopting a dogmatic attitude
towards it.
This leads to the ready assumption, often challenged but persistently
influential, that the two approaches are entirely mutually exclusive, and
that the results of science can therefore be considered to be free of
speculation and hence of dogma and bias.
This philosophy leads the historian to attempt to record without
bias all the facts as they are; yet once a person, historian or
not, accepts a division of mankind into open-minded and closed?
minded, he almost invariably finds himself on the right side.
A further consequence is that the open-minded/closed-minded, scientific/
unscientific distinction, originally meant to be awarded on the basis of
method, is all too easily awarded on the basis of content, especially in
retrospect.

For if we consider our current beliefs to be based on open-

minded and truly scientific examination of the facts, then open-minded
and truly scientific thinkers of the past are easily identified as those
whose views agree with, or at least anticipate, our own. After all, ours are
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the views that we believe sound empirical method, applied by anybody at
any time, would support.
Agassi points out that in view of the changing nature of modern
scientific theories, potential embarrassment awaits inductivist historians of
science engaged in judging the figures of the past along these lines. This is
why, he says, inductivist histories of science must be periodically rewritten,
so that credit for anticipating modern scientific understanding can be
redistributed in better accordance with current belief.

Baconian inductivism,

with its simplistic belief in a totally sharp distinction between facts and
theories, cannot account adequately for controversy or for radical change in
science, and these aspects have to be minimized in inductivist histories and
philosophies of science.
Thomas Kuhn is perhaps the best known popularizer of the anti-Baconian
view that all observations or facts are theory-laden, and that empiricism
cannot, therefore, be cleanly purged of speculation's inductivists would like.^
Kuhn's notion of science as governed by a succession of incommensurable
paradigms entails that the science of any age has governing assumptions, not
themselves proved by the methods of the science, that shape those methods and
define the problems to which they are applied.

Kuhn sees no rational basis for

choosing among rival sets of assumptions; he frames explanations of paradigm
shifts in terms of the sociology, not the methodology, of science:
Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the
transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at
a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt
switch, it must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an
instant) or not at all.
Ultimately his theory is in agreement with the observation that he cites from
Max Planck's autobiography, that
...a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its
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opponents eventuajjy die, and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it.
It is consistent with a Baconian inductivist position that philosophy
as such, except when limited analysis of scientific concepts, as the positivists
proposed, must be rejected as "speculation," representing an illicit attempt
to sidestep the requirement for evidence and observation.

Its prominence, on

this view, would be expected to diminish steadily as scientific understanding
advances.

Speculation is never to be considered legitimate; it flourishes

best, however, where no real knowledge is yet available to make it unnecessary.
The status of these views themselves, insofar as they might fall into the
category of unacceptable speculation, is not addressed; one cannot glibly
say, however, that this shows the theory is false because self-contradictory.
A similar problem arises in connection with Kuhn's philosophy, for his own
views seem to be presented as transcending all paradigms, causing his theory
to be a self-reflexive criticism of itself.

This is a form of an old question

with many versions: is a relativist inconsistent in claiming validity for the
relativist position?

That is, does that claim itself appeal to a concept of

(non-relative) truth which the relativist has renounced?
What this brief and incomplete account of controversy in the field of
philosophy of science is meant to bring out is a criticism that has been made
many times by critics of Baconian and positivist thinking. This criticism is
that the view that philosophy has no role in science represents, itself, a
particular philosophical position.

Another way of saying this has been that

rejection of metaphysics as "unscientific" or "meaningless" is itself a
piece of metaphysics.

Furthermore, as a metaphysical view, it is peculiarly

barricaded against controversy, since the appropriate philosophical criticisms
and counterclaims are not acknowledged to be applicable.

14
Agassi cites an example of the persisting influence of Baconian
dichotomies from a lecture on "Science and History" by Professor Douglas
McKie, a modern historian of science:
A historian of science, says McKie, may be personally interested
in the philosophy of science, as he himself is; qua historian,
however, he has no use for it; his business if simply to study
the rise of scientific ideas as it took place "in fact with the
scientific detail of experiment and observation from which these
ideas emerged." Professor McKie emphasizes that his is the
majority view, and he is right. But the majority view need not
be correct; to argue that the philosophy of science is irrelevant
to the study of the emergence of scientific ideas from facts is
barely feasible because the philosophy of science is largely about
whether scientific ideas do emerge from facts.
This historian has not, as he claims, managed

qua historian to eschew

philosophy; rather, he has taken a position, on a philosophical issue of
special relevance to his field, that seems to him so obvious that he does not
recognize it as a philosophical position at all.
The Baconian view that scientific observation is free of assumptions,
in spite of being widely criticized by modern philosophers of science, retains
a sufficiently strong hold to be considered by some people self-evidently
true. In the "social sciences," where philosophies of science have arguably
had more influence than in the natural sciences themselves, it is particularly
necessary to be aware of the possible presence of unrecognized assumptions, of
which the most central is the Baconian conviction that no unrecognized assumptions
have been made. This is the context for approaching Frankl's efforts to
clarify philosophical issues in psychology, to which I will turn in the next
section.

■
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II.

PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN METAPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE
WORK OF VIKTOR FRANKL

Viktor Frank! has brought the challenge of articulating and
criticizing unacknowledged philosophical assumptions to bear on meta¬
psychology and psychotherapy, referring to what he calls the "metaclini cal"
aspects of psychotherapy.
The metaclinical implications of psychotherapy refer mainly to
its concept of man and philosophy of life. There is no
psychotherapy without a theory of man and a philosophy of life
underlying it. Wittingly or unwittingly, psychotherapy is based
on them. In this respect psychoanalysis is no exception.
Every school of psychotherapy has a concept of man, although
this concept is not always held consciously.
It is up to us to
make it conscious. We who have learned so much from Freud need
scarcely point out how dangerous the unconscious can become. We
must make explicit the implicit concept of man in psychotherapy.
For a psychotherapist's concept of man, under certain circumstances,
can reinforce the patient's neurosis, can be wholly nihilistic.
Frankl is especially concerned with scrutinizing some of the underlying
assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis, which he says "is, and will remain
forever, the indispensible foundation of every psychotherapy, including any
future schools."

22

He does go on to say, "However, it will also have to share

the fate of a foundation, that is to say, it will become invisible to the
extent to which the proper building is erected on it."

23

Freud, in his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, expresses
the view that psychoanalysis, in keeping with its scientific nature, has no
Weitanschauung other than that of science itself.

He gives to Weltanschauung

a somewhat unusual and strongly Baconian definition, one which invites the
negative assessment he goes on to give it.
In my opinion then, a Weitanschauung is an intellectual
construction which solves all the problems of our existence
uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which,
accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which
everything that interests us finds its fixed place.
It will
easily be understood that the possession of a Weitanschauung of

'
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this kind is among the ideal wishes of human beings. Believing
in it one can feel secure in life, one can know what to strive
for, and how one can deal most expediently with one's emotions
and interests.
These are the characteristics of a religion, according to Freud's understanding
of religion, which would be challenged as incomplete by religious people of
many traditions.

25

And religion is directly opposed by Freud to scientific

thinking, with which he identifies psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis, he says,

is "not in a position to develop a Weitanschauung of its own" but "must
accept the scientific one."

The scientific one as he presents it is really

more of an anti-Weitanschauung, again according to his definition of that
concept. For in his view the ideals of science distinctively require that we
renounce hope for "an intellectual construction that can solve all the
problems of our existence...leaving no question unanswered"; in exchange
we gain the more modest satisfactions of the patient and sober search for
truth.
But the Weltanschauung of science already departs noticeably
from our definition.
It is true that it too assumes the
uniformity of the explanation of the universe; but it does so
only as a programme the fulfillment of which is relegated to the
future. Apart from this it is marked by negative characteristics,
by its limitation to what is at the moment knowable and by its
sharp rejection of certain elements that are alien to it.
It
asserts that there are no sources of knowledge of the universe
other than the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized
observations--in other words, what we call research--and of it?7
no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or divination.
In considering Frankl's countering claim that philosophical assumptions
are present in psychoanalysis along with all other psychological theories, we
must examine what Frank! means by philosophy. He is really discussing philosophy
in two different though related senses, one concerned with underlying concepts
of human nature, and the other concerned with underlying methodological
choices.

17
The first sense of philosophy as he uses it is that of "philosophy of
life," as in the first quotation from him above, where the word is used more
or less interchangeably with "concept of man."

This is philosophy as a

content; it will be contrasted later with philosophy in Frankl's second sense
where it is considered as process.

Much of Frankl's work is a sustained

criticism of modern psychology for failing to do justice to what he calls
"the humanness of man."
The human quality of a human being is disregarded and neglected,
for example, by those psychologists who adhere to either "the
machine model" or "the rat model," as Gordon W. All port termed
them. As to the first, I deem it a remarkable fact that man,
as long as he regarded himself as a creature, interpreted his
existence in the image of God, his creator: but as soon as he
started considering himself as a creator, he began to interpret
his existence merely in the image of his own creation, the
machine.
Frankl proposes a conceptual scheme, referred to as "dimensional
ontology," according to which it should be recognized that the physical
level and the psychodynamic level of human functioning, while their importance
is not disputed, are contained in a more inclusive "noetic" or "spiritual"
level.

He makes it clear that in using the word "spiritual," he is still

remaining in the realm of purely human phenomena:
Logotherapy simply states: man is searching. But it can never
decide if he is searching for a God he has invented, for a Gotf
he has discovered, for a God he cannot find, or for himself.
The noetic level is where authentic, irreducible concerns with artistic,
intellectual, moral and religious aspects of life are found. According to
Frankl's dimensional ontology, biological and psychodynamic conceptions are
related to the whole human being as two-dimensional shadows would be to a
three-dimensional object. He invokes the image of a cylinder which casts a
round shadow when illuminated from one direction and a rectangular shadow
when illuminated from another.

Their apparent incompatibility can only be

.
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resolved by recognizing how they are related as partial truths.
a sense, right in what it asserts and wrong in what it denies.

Each is, in
As Frank! says,

in what I think is one of the most illuminating of all his comments on
the concepts of man he considers incomplete.
But does the danger really lie in the lack of universality?
Doesn't it rather lurk in the pretense of totality? What is
dangerous is the attempt of a man who is an expert, say, in the
field of biology, to understand and explain human beings
exclusively in terms of biology. At the moment at which totality
is claimed, biology becomes biologism, psychology becomes
psychologism, and sociology becomes sociologism.
In other
words, at that moment science is turned into ideology. What we
have to deplore, I would say, is not that scientists a^g
specializing but that the specialists are generalizing.
Dimensional ontology is anti-reductionistic.

It is opposed to the

notion that events at any of these levels are "nothing but" epiphenomena,
causally determined by events at another level.

As Frankl says, his theory

acknowledges limited determinism--that is, it must take account of the fact
that a person lives within

some

biological, psychological and social

conditions that he/she may not be able to change.

What he maintains is that

even in the most extreme of limiting circumstances one is free to choose one's
attitude toward these circumstances.
power of the spirit."

He calls this capacity "the defiant

He rejects the "pan-determinism"--which philosophers

discussing the question of free will have traditionally referred to simply as
determinism-r-of reductionist thinking; he does not, however, deny the reality
of inner and outer constraints, or the many times when events at one level do
determine those at another.
Frankl's conviction that one is always free to choose one's attitude even
in the most hopeless of circumstances was strengthened by his experiences and
observations as a Jew in the German concentration camps during World War II.
In those settings he and his companions were indeed faced with the extreme of
oppression and denial of ordinary freedoms and basic human needs. This extreme

..
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situation might be expected to overwhelm individual differences, leaving
no latitude for choosing how one will respond to circumstances. "However,"
Frank! says, "the reverse was true.

The beast was unmasked--and so was the

saint.
If I still had any need of proof that this defiant power of the
spirit is a reality, then the concentration camp was the
crucial experiment. Freud asserts, "Let one attempt to expose
a number of the most diverse people uniformly to hunger. With
the increase of the imperative urge of hunger all individual
differences will blur, and in their stead will appear the
uniform expression of the one unstilled urge." But this simply
was not so.
It was in the concentration camps that Frank! also experienced how a sense
having
of meaning in/something to survive for, whether a person, an unfinished work
or a religious or moral ideal, often meant the difference between life and
death. His therapeutic work both in that situation and later was directed
toward helping people discover what it was they felt was worth living for.
To a large extent the kinds of reasons Frankl offers for preferring
his concept of man, with its emphasis on the noetic, are valid only from
within his own point of view. He claims that reductionism in psychology
must be rejected because it is nihilistic and unhealthy; and more generally
he asserts that a Weltanschauung can be judged "right" or "wrong" according
to whether or not it is anti-reductioniStic:
Thus the issue cannot be whether or not psychotherapy is based
on a Weltanschauung but rather, whether the Weitanschauung
underlying it is right or wrong. Right or wrong, however, in
this context means whether or not the humanness of man is
preserved in a given philosophy and theory.
This claim must be regarded as tendentious, for it is only according to
Frankl's own view that the humanness of man is not preserved in the views
he calls psychologism or biologism.

He is offering a criterion for

considering a concept of man to be "right" that applies to his own view,
in preference to others, by definition.

Frankl's dimensional ontology

'■
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provides valuable aid in explicating his views on how the theories he
considers reductionist are related to his own; but it supplies no argument
or proof that the theories are reductionists in an unacceptable sense.

From

Frankl's point of view they are; from the point of view of their adherents
they have genuinely succeeded in assimilating one class of phenomena into
another, with a resulting gain in explanatory power.
Frankl would be helped here by Agassi's distinction between two kinds
of reductionists theories: those that attempt to explain one class of
phenomena in terms of another (the classic example is the reduction of
chemistry to physics) and those that explain away a whole class of phenomena.
Efforts of the first kind, he believes, must be judged individually by their
results; whereas efforts of the second kind can never be of any real interest
to people with a serious concern with the things they purport to explain
away.

He illustrates the difference by presenting two ways of asserting

the thesis that "man is a machine," according to the two approaches.
The version which explains away distinctively human phenomena such as
self-consciousness and moral life by equating humans with machines holds that
humans can only do what (other) machines are observed to do.

In other

words, the theory holds not only that humans are machines but that they are
just like other machines.

It is explaining away such as this that most

people, including Frankl, attack when they attack reductionism.

But the

second—explanatory—kind of reductionism would put the man-as-machine
thesis differently: "Perhaps a machine can have self-consciousness and a
moral life." As Agassi puts it,
...we do observe that men are thinking and suffering beings,
even though we still do not know whether they are or can be
machines.
For, if one day we conclude that morality can never
apply to machines then we shall be able to conclude that men
cannot be machines--and conversely. All traditional philosophical
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anthropology, I contend, with the sole exception of that of
Kant, overlooked this point to some extent or another. This,
rather obvious, point of scientific methodology seems to be at
the root of the discussion.
It is unsatisfactory to explain
away the observed specific human qualities: Perhaps man is a
machine, but if so then he is a machine of a very special
kind, a thinking and suffering machine, and hence a moral
machine.
If such a machine is not possible, then, obviously
man is not a machine. One way or another, we cannot.overlook
or explain away man's observed moral peculiarities.
Agassi further emphasizes that many times a program for explanation is
presented as if it were already an explanation.
man as machine or man as animal

He holds that theories of

(to which exactly parallel arguments apply)

are actually such programs for explanation, and that much confusion has
been generated by discussing them without recognizing this.
As applied to Freud, the question of which of these two sorts of
reduction!'sm his theories involve is, at the very least, more complicated
than Frank!'s criticisms would suggest.

Frankl speaks as though Freud's

reductionism clearly involved the intention of explaining away noetic
concerns.

Frankl quotes a passage from a letter of Freud to Binswanger

which is a favorite among critics of Freud who feel that he neglected the
non-instinctual aspects of human existence: "I have always confined myself
to the ground floor and basement of the edifice."
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Frankl feels this

statement shows Freud laudably aware that his theories do justice only to
some aspects of human beings—that it leaves room, in effect, for dimensional
ontology.

But he considers Freud to fall back into reductionism in the

continuation of the quoted passage:
—You maintain that by changing one's point of view, one can also
see an upper story, in which dwell such distinguished guests as
religion, art, etc. You are not the only one to say this; most
cultured specimens of homo natura think the same thing.
In this
you are conservative, and I revolutionary.
If I still had a
lifetime of work ahead of me, I would be confident of my ability
to make room in my humble little house for those lofty things.
I have already found a place for religion, by putting it under
the category of 'the neurosis of mankind.'
But probably we are

'
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speaking at cross purposes^ and our differences will be ironed
out only after centuries.
It is problematic to press a metaphor such as this too far.

It does

sound as though Freud is outlining a program for reductionistic explanation
("to make room in my humble little house for those lofty things"), not for
explaining away.

It is on the basis of the limitations of Freud's conception

of religion, rather than on a generalized charge of reductionism, that
critics such as Frankl might argue that Freud is involved in explaining
away. That is, what Freud has explained or is trying to explain is, in any
case, not what they understand by religion.

To the extent that Freud may

have failed to do justice to many aspects of religious life, he could justly
be seen as explaining them away, or perhaps just as ignoring them. Frankl
says that in calling religion "the neurosis of mankind" Freud

is

reductionistic.

Following Agassi we can see that it might be reductionistic in either of the
two ways: in theory it could as well be taken to expand the notion of neurosis
as to reduce that of religion.
Frankl himself comes close to this position in discussing the
inevitability of partial perspectives and different levels of explanation in
science.

In this connection he realizes that the type of reductionism he

rejects is not a characteristic of a method as such, but of a mistaken
understanding of the method. This leads to a discussion of the second of the
two senses of philosophy in Frankl's work.

Philosophy in this sense does

not refer to any set of substantive views, ideals or values, Rather, it
designates the process of scrutinizing one's ideas for the presence and
influence of unrecognized assumptions and of remembering to take account
of those assumptions critically.

I think the heart of Frankl's work in

bringing philosophy into psychology is in his turning attention to this
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activity: "We must make explicit the implicit concept of man in
psychotherapy."
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Speaking in this vein, Frankl argues that avoiding reductionism is
not a matter of choosing one theory or concept of man over another and
then being committed

to viewing it as the only correct one (though at

times Frankl himself falls into this error).

Rather, avoiding reductionism

is a matter of consciousness; it is a matter of being aware of the inevitable
bias and incompleteness introduced into one's thinking by the nature of
the intellectual tools employed.

The fault, that is, is not in the tools,

but in ourselves insofar as we fail to remain or become conscious of their
1imitations.
In discussing the question of whether regarding Joan of Arc as a
schizophrenic is incompatible with regarding her as a saint, Frankl says,
A psychiatrist should confine himself to the dimension of
psychiatry rather than conclude from a psychiatric phenomenon
whether it is nothing but, or more than a psychiatric phenomenon.
Confining himself to the dimension of psychiatry, however,
implies projecting a given phenomenon into the dimension of
psychiatry. This is perfectly 1egitimate as long as the
psychiatrist is aware of what he does.
Even more, projections
are not only legitimate but also obligatory in science.
Science
cannot cope with reality in its multi dimensionality but must
deal with reality as if reality were unidimensional.
However,
a scientist should remain aware of what he does, if for ng
other reason than to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism.
(my underlining)
If our methodological approach involves systematically ignoring some of
the qualities of the phenomena, as, for example, Newtonian mechanics involved
ignoring so-called "secondary" characterisecssuch as color, this must be
remembered; otherwise it might seem that the resulting theory proved the
unimportance or non-existence of what it had left out. As applied to
psychology, Frankl argues that the psychodynamic approach has systematically
excluded the level of meaning; whether the simplification is valuable or
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misleading depends on whether appropriate attention has been given to the
fact that it is a simplification.
Yet, if this does not occur with a full consciousness that a
specific methodological approach has been chosen, then it can
completely lead us astray. Above all, we must bear in mind
all that we have thereby filtered out; for, in an exclusively
psychodynamic approach, certain human phenomena will entirely
escape us. We need to think here only of things like meaning
and value; they must disappear from our field of vision as
soon as we consider instincts and dynamics as the only valid
criteria, and indeed thev^must for the simple reason that values
do not drive--they pull.
Frank! actually considers Freud's thought, in all its complexity,
development and change over time, only in a cursory fashion. He quotes
occasional remarks of Freud, but no major texts, nor does he seem
particularly interested in the train of reasoning that led Freud to
undertake his explanatory program.
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In part Frankl could be said to

belong to the class of critics mentioned by Freud as simply rejecting his
conclusions because they seem too unpleasant.

Frankl, in defending his

own world-view, often quotes the saying of Goethe:
If we take people as they are, we make them worse. If we
treat them as if they were what they ought to be, we help
them become what they are capable of becoming.
He calls this "the finest maxim for any kind of psychotherapy."

In effect

his objection to the views he attributes to Freud, as well as to other views
that he considers nihilistic, is not so much that they are false as that they
might become true.

Freud too was aware of the potential impact for good or

ill of a conception of human nature, but he felt that damage is done, on the
contrary, by a conception that is too rosy:
Unfortunately what history tells us and what we ourselves have
experienced does not speak in this sense [that "man is naturally
good or at least good-natured"] but rather justifies a judgment
that belief in the 'goodness' of human nature is one of those evil
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illusions by which mankind expect their lives to be beauj^fied
and made easier while in reality they only cause damage.
Of course, it is not necessary to deny that both these dangers exist.
On the level of method, Frankl criticizes Freud for being antiphilosophical, and for representing science in general and the "science"
of psychoanalysis in particular in a naive empiricist way.

Thus he is making

two different kinds of objections. The first is to the specific content of
a conception of human nature that he attributes, with some oversimplification,
to Freud.

The second is to the failure of Freud and others to recognize the

presence of a shaping concept of human nature in their work and to make
that concept explicit.
There is, however, a connection.

The same philosophical bias is

involved in Freud's minimizing the extent to which he was choosing
regulating metaphysical conceptions in his own intellectual endeavor, and in
his minimizing the importance of choices of this kind (assigned by Frankl to
the category "noological") in the lives of people.

Putting it epigrammatically

it could be said that in Freud's work we see Baconian empiricist assumptions
about the nature of science revealing their logical implications for the
realm of psychology.

The implication for the content of his theories is in

minimizing noological issues; the implications for methodology are in
minimizing the need for awareness and critical scrutiny of one's assumptions.

H
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FRANKL'S CRITIQUE OF THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE AND THE NOTION OF
HOMEOSTASIS IN MOTIVATION THEORY

Frank!'s criticisms of the pleasure principle, or, as he calls it,
the "wil1-to-pleasure," as providing an inadequate account of human
motivation rely on several different types and levels of argument.

He

contends that the search for pleasure is self-defeating; that it is
characteristic not of healthy functioning but only of the neurotic; and
that as part of a homeostasis theory it denies any real involvement with
anything outside the self except as a means to produce for the self
certain desired mental or physical states. It is the last of these to which
he gives by far the most importance, and in which the philosophical issues
that connect him with the eighteenth century moralists are directly raised.
Once again, the application to Freud's thought is quite general.
Frankl addresses his arguments to views he considers widely prevalent and
particularly characteristic of Freudian psychoanalysis.

These views

involve postulating a "will to pleasure" that directly or indirectly
determines all actions. "Pleasure" is sometimes spoken of in his discussion
as a positive good, and sometimes simply as the cessation of pain, that is,
relief of tension caused by unfulfilled needs.

Whether, when, and in what

form, and especially for what reasons Freud actually held the particular
views that Frankl criticizes are questions Frankl does not explore. Nor
does he address the extensive modifications of the instinct theory by
later psychoanalytic theorists such as Hartmann and Erikson.^
While Frankl does not address Freud's own formulations of the
pleasure principle directly, it is useful to bear in mind a few of these
formulations in considering Frankl's discussion. According to Freud, the
instincts or drives seek the removal of stimulation, which is postulated

'
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by him to be unpleasant.
An instinct, then, is distinguished from a stimulus by the
fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within the
body, that it operates as a constant force and that the
subject cannot avoid it by flight, as is possible with an
external stimulus.
Its source is a state of excitation in
the body, its aim is the removal of that excitation; on its
path from its source to its aim the instinct becomes operative
psychically. We picture it as a certain quota of energy which
presses in a particular direction.
It is from this pressing
that it derives its name of "Trieb."
The term "economic" emphasizes the lack of qualitative distinction between
these "quota of energy."
The id of course knows no judgments of value: no good and evil,
no morality. The economic, or, if you prefer, the
quantitative factor, which is intimately linked to the pleasure
principle, dominates all its processes.
Instinctual cathexes
^
seeking discharge--that, in our view, is all there is in the id.
Freud describes the pleasure principle, in his General Introduction
to Psycho-Analysis, as follows, with the warning that these considerations
belong to "one of the most important, but unfortunately one of the most
obscure, territories of psycho-analysis":
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We may put the question whether a main purpose is discernible
in the operation of the mental apparatus; and our first approach
to an answer is that this purpose is directed to the attainment
of pleasure.
It seems that our entire psychical activity is bent
upon procuring pieasure and avoiding pain, that it is
automatically regulated by the PLEASURE-PRINCIPLE. Now
of all things in the world we should like to know what are
the conditions giving rise to pleasure and pain, but that is
just where we fall short. We may only venture to say that
pleasure is in some way connected with lessening, lowering,
or extinguishing the amount of stimulation present in the mental
apparatus; and that pain involves a heightening of the latter.
He also indicates that the pleasure principle can be seen as part of a more
general effort to maintain homeostasis, or the lowest possible level of
stimulation:
It appears that we can describe the tasks and performances of
the mental apparatus in another way and more generally than
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by emphasizing the attainment of pleasure. We can say that
the mental apparatus serves the purpose of mastering and
dischargin^gthe masses of supervening stimuli, the quantities
of energy.
Though Freud says "the transition from the pleasure-principle to the
reality-principle is one of the most important advances in the development
of the ego,"
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the reality principle does not have different goals but

only different methods.

It is only a "modification" of the pleasure

principle under the influence of necessity.
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The pleasure sought by

the reality principle is delayed and diminished, and in exchange for this
putatively more secure, but it is not different in kind.

"The ego is after

all only a portion of the id, a portion that has been expediently modified
by the proximity of the external world with its threat of danger."

52

Only at one stage did Freud consider the pleasure principle to be
the sole determinant of psychic life.

Later, as in Beyond the Pleasure

Principie, he adduced phenomena such as repetition compulsion for which he
felt the pleasure principle could not adequately account. He also introduced
in that work complex speculations about different types of instincts, life
instincts and death instincts, of which only the death instincts seemed
fully consistent with the pleasure principle.
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Yet it is only the earlier notions of pleasure as the universal goal
that Frank! discusses.

I think this is because it is that conception that he

needs to modify in order to establish his own theories.

His underlying concern

is to establish the importance of meaning for peoples' lives--a very
practical, 1ife-or-death importance in situations of extreme suffering such
as Frankl experienced. And meaninq, for him, involves havinq qoals that
are outside oneself. Denyinq that this is possible destroys meaninq on a
grand scale. Hence Frankl's real target is the element in Freud's theories
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that can be used, and has been used, to support such a conclusion. It is
of relatively less importance to him that this element may have exerted its
influence on subsequent developments in psychology, as well as on the
popular culture, in a much less subtle form than it had in its original
context.
Frankl's first argument against the pleasure principle, as he has
defined it, is that pleasure cannot be the fundamental goal of human
activity because it can arise only as a by-product of pursuit of other
goals, eluding direct pursuit.
For didactic reasons the will to meaning has been counterposed
by way of a heuristic oversimplification both to the pleasure
principle, which is so pervasive in psychoanalytic motivational
theories, and to the will to power, the concept which plays
such a decisive role in Adlerian psychology. I do not weary
of contending that the will to pleasure is really a selfdefeating principle inasmuch as the more a man would actually
set out to strive for pleasure the less he would gain it.
This is due to the fundamental fact that pleasure is a by¬
product, or side effect, of the fulfillment of our strivings,
but is destroyed and spoiled to the extent to which it is made
a goal or target.
Not only pleasure but also happiness, peace of mind, good conscience,
"self-actualization" and good health are in Frankl's view by-products of
dedication to purposes other than the attaining of these things themselves.
"..'pursuit of happiness' amounts to a self-contradiction: the more we
strive for happiness, the less we attain it."
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The person who devotes

his or her life to health is not healthy but hypochondriac; the person
who wants to be morally justified is too self-absorbed to be genuinely
moral.
A man who is striving for a condition in which he can rightly
say, "I possess a good conscience" would already represent a
case of Pharisaism. A really good conscience can never be
reached by grasping for it, but solely by doing a deed for
the sake of a cause, or for the sake of the person involved,
or for God's sake.0
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Interpretation according to the pleasure principle could not do justice
to the difference between these two cases.
Frankl takes the self-contradictory nature of direct pursuit of
pleasure to be evidence that pleasure is not what human beings ultimately
pursue.
This can be stated in a simple formula: The aims of both
the hedonistic philosophy of the Epicureans and the quietistic
philosophy of the Stoics, i.e., happiness and peace of mind
(or, as the latter was called by the ancient Greeks, ataraxia),
cannot possibly be the real aim of human behavior, and they
cannot for the a priori reason that they elude man exactly to
the same degree that he strives for them.
Yet there is nothing impossible in the notion of human striving as inherently
self-contradictory and doomed to frustration. According to such a—tragicvision, pleasure or happiness might be an unattainable, even paradoxical, aim,
and still a real one.
As his second argument, Frankl points out that there are instances
where pleasure does serve as a "real" aim of human behavior; these are in
cases of neurosis.

On this view the pleasure principle is flawed in that

it unjustifiably assimilates all striving to neurotic striving.

It is

indeed from knowledge of cases such as the examples he refers to of
sexual dysfunction, that he observes "the self-thwarting quality of
pleasure intention."
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Furthermore, this is the basis for his therapeutic

techniques of "dereflection" and "paradoxical intention," in which a patient
is invited to extricate him- or herself from this self-defeating striving
by deliberately redirecting effort.
In the face of what he considers an ever more widespread loss of sense
of meaning—the "existential vacuum"—Frankl observes that many people are
living for the sake of pleasure or power in some form.

If he bases his

objection to this on the observation that such lives are rarely happy,
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he has come full circle in his argument.

He could be considered to be

proposing not an abandonment but an improvement of the striving for pleasure,
according to the following observation: if you want to pursue pleasure
intelligently (successfully), you must pursue it indirectly.
These first two points, whatever their merits as psychological
insights, really miss the fundamental nature of Freud's hypothesis.

For

in these two arguments Frankl is talking about happiness and pleasure in
the everyday sense, the sense which would allow them to be contrasted
meaningfully with other goals, such as fame, power, artistic or intellectual
accomplishment, moral perfection, wisdom.

It may well be that the choice

of happiness, from among these and other possibilities, is paradoxical in
that it defeats itself.

But the claim of the pleasure principle is a much

more radical one: it claims that from the point of view of motivation all
these choices are the same.
differing only in

They are all made in pursuit of pleasure,

the degree to which the satisfaction must be obtained

indirectly or incompletely, due to repression.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud specifically addresses the
question of an "instinct toward perfection" in human beings, finding this
to be an illusion:
The present development of human beings requires, as it seems to
me, no different explanation from that of animals. What appears
in a minority of human individuals as an untiring impulsion
towards further perfection can easily be understood as a result
of the instinctual repression upon which is based all that is
most precious in human civilization. The repressed instinct
never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction, which would
consist in the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction 59
The pleasure principle, that is to say, makes claims about the nature of
any striving, whether it be for happiness or something else.

Narrowing the

focus to striving that is explicitly aimed at achieving pleasure or
happiness really raises a different set of questions.
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Frank!’s third and central line of arguments against the pleasure
principle does move away from these questions about where direct striving
for pleasure can be observed and whether it works as a practical matter, and
takes up the central issues about how striving of any kind is to be understood.
Here his criticism of the pleasure principle is explicitly embedded in
criticism of the underlying notion of motivation as aimed, as Freud suggested,
at restoring or maintaining homeostasis.

On such a view, Frank! quotes

Allport as saying, "motivation is regarded as a state of tenseness that leads
us to seek equilibrium, rest, adjustment, satisfaction, or homeostasis.

From

this point of view personality is nothing more than our habitual modes of
reducing tension."
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Frankl's objection is that this denies the individual's

relation to the world:
From such a perspective, man is considered in what I call a
monadologistic way, and his tie with the world in which he
exists is disregarded.
In a monadologistic view of man there is no place for any
true encounter between man on the one hand and the world and
its objects on the other. The objects in the world are no longer
seen in their objective essence but, instead, only as more or
less useful tools for the maintenance of homeostasis. There
is no room left for anything such as commitment to a cause
for its own sake or participation with a partner for the
partner's sake.
Instead, causes and partners are devaluated
to the level of mere means to an end--the end of restoring
certain conditions in the subject's psychic system. As means,
they appear to the subject.to have no value in themselves but
to be only of use to him.
Arguing along somewhat Kantian lines, Frank! draws the further conclusion
that where other people only figure as means to an end, rather than as
ends in themselves, there is no real morality.
In the framework of the psychodynamic interpretation of
conscience, man strives for moral behavior only for the sake of
getting rid of the stimulus of a bad conscience or, to stick
to psychodynamic terminology, the stimulus of a discontented
superego. Obviously, such a view of man's moral behavior
misses the point of true morality, which begins only when man
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has begun to act for the sake of something or someone, but
not for his own sake, that is, for the sake?of having a good
conscience or of getting rid of a bad one.
Again, he is not claiming that maintenance of homeostasis and reduction
of tension cannot be regulating goals, but only that this represents a
pathological state, and should not be accepted as defining the whole
possible spectrum of experience:
As a finite being, man never perfectly completes his life
task. When he is willing and able to shoulder the burden of
this incompleteness, he is acknowledging this finiteness. This
acceptance of finiteness is the precondition to mental health
and human progress, while the inability to accept it is
characteristic of the neurotic personality. Thus the
homeostasis principle, of which we spoke previously, is by
no means a normal phenomenon but rather a neurotic one.
It
is the neurotic individual who cannot abide the normal tension
of life—whether physical, psychic, or moral. 0
Criticism of theories of motivation based on drives and homeostasis
has been widespread in the field of animal behavior, as well as in many
schools of human psychology including psychoanalysis.
and varied company in raising his objections.

Frankl is

in a large

The psychologist Robert

White described in a review article in 1959 the emergence of deepening
discontent with theories of motivation of this kind both in animal behavior
studies and in psychoanalytic ego psycho!ogy.^

White refers in particular

to a considerable amount of evidence that is difficult to reconcile with
classical drive theories, such as reports of observations that both animals
and humans seem motivated to learn and to develop competence for its own
sake, in experimental situations where their major instinctual needs have
all been satisfied, and the competence is not required to maintain that
state.

Of course, in the face of any amount of evidence, one could decide

to speak of a new drive, e.g., a drive for competence, or even for excitement
or novelty.

Would this simply be a semantic trick?

White claims that

-
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"the motivation needed to attain competence cannot be wholly derived from
sources of energy currently conceptualized as drives or instincts."

65

Does

it matter whether the drive theory is abandoned or exapnded to include ever
less straightforwardly biological needs?
From Agassi's point of view it probably does not matter, providing
that retaining the term "drive" does not subtly tend toward assimilating the
newly recognized motives to others--especially those relating to reproduction
and survival--more traditionally emphasized.
it matters a great deal.

To Frank!, on the other hand,

He takes some pains to emphasize that the will

to meaning that he describes should not be viewed as another drive. For
on Frankl's view "drive" inherently implies striving toward homeostasis, and
striving toward homeostasis locates the ultimate goal of all action in states
of oneself:
The reality principle is, according to Freud's own words, a
mere extension of the pleasure principle; one which serves
the pleasure principle's purpose. One could just as well say
that the pleasure principle itself is a mere extension working
in the service cf a wider concept called the homeostasis
principle and serves its purposes.
Ultimately, the psycho¬
dynamic concept of man presents him as a being basically
concerned with maintaining or restoring his inner equilibrium,
and in order to do so, he is trying to gratify his drives and
satisfy his instincts....What has been sacrificed, however, and
hence totally eliminated in this view of man, is the fundamental
fact which lends itself to a phenomenological analysis--namely,
that man is a being encountering other beings and reaching out
for meanings to fulfill.
And this is precisely the reason why I speak of a will to
meaning rather than a need for meaning or a drive to meaning.
If man were really driven to meaning he would embark on meaning
fulfillment solely for the sake of getting rid of this drive,
in order to restore homeostasis within himself. At the same
time, however, he would no longer be really concerned with
meaning itself but rather with his owa equi1ibriurn and thus,
in the final analysis, with himself.
(my underlining)
Whether the will to meaning is construed as a drive or not, problems
are introduced simply by echoing other theories even to the extent of using

'
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this term.

Donald Tweedie has pointed out, in a perceptive discussion of

Frankl's paper "The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy," where many of
Frankl's views on this subject are developed, that if Frank! is to be
consistent in his own argument, "meaning" really cannot be considered a
goal in itself either.

"I think that...'meaning1 per jse serves no better

as an end in itself (suffering the fate of all

'bloodless categories') than

does 'pleasure' or 'power' or 'self-actualization.'"^ The "didactic reasons"
which Frankl says are responsible for what he avows is an oversimplification,
lead him to obscure somewhat his own point.

Meaning too is a by-product.

I think that in Frankl's terms doing something for its own sake and doing it
for the sake of "meaning" are the same; yet the second of these ways of
speaking introduces a confusing parallel to the other theories that Frankl
is criticizing.

The confusion may go deeper than awkward semantics; this

is hard to say.
What Frankl is rejecting with this third and broadest argument against
the pleasure principle is the theory known, in moral philosophy, as philosophical
egoism.

In effect his third argument is, "if we accept the pleasure principle,

we accept philosophical egoism."

This is an important connection to make.

But, obviously, it works as an argument only to the extent that good arguments
against philosophical egoism itself are available.

These are not supplied

by Frankl; he tends to treat the theory as self-evidently objectionable,
as if the discovery that it is implied in the pleasure principle were almost
e reductio ad absurdum of that principle.
eighteenth century moral philosophy

However, in the context of

the theory of philosophical egoism was

extensively debated. In that context we can find helpful elucidations of
some confusions that tend to support the theory, though no absolutely
definitive arguments against it.

.
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IV.

FRANKL'S VIEWS IN THE CONTEXT OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY: BUTLER AND
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEBATE OVER PHILOSOPHICAL EGOISM

The issues Frankl raises against Freud's pleasure principle can be
seen to echo many earlier discussions in moral philosophy.

Frankl's

position ultimately rests on rejecting the notion that human motivation
in all its apparent diversity can be reduced to a concern with maintaining
homeostasis, and hence, to a concern with oneself.

His discussion is

centered around Freud's pleasure principle, but it is really the underlying
issue of whether it is possible to have motives that go beyond this kind
is
of self-concern that he most interested in.

Views much like the one he

is questioning can also be found in ancient philosophy, among, for example,
the Greek Sophists, the Chinese Legalists and the Roman Epicureans, and
more recently in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville, and
CO

some of the nineteenth century utilitarians.

The view developed by all

these writers has been referred to as "philosophical egoism" and it is
really the debate about philosophical egoism that Frankl has joined.
Accordingly, there is also a long history of criticism of egoist views
along lines somewhat similar to Frankl's.

Indeed it seems that the whole

spectrum of views on this subject has been developed repeatedly, suggesting
that perhaps the egoist and anti-egoist views all represent valid aspects
of experience which their respective adherents have chosen to stress.
In the moral philosophy of the eighteenth century in England, in
particular, these issues were canvassed with great thoroughness.

The moral

philosopher and theologian Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham (1692-1752)
developed powerful arguments against the version of philosophical egoism
represented by Hobbes and Mandeville in his time. He is considered by many
modern philosophers to have produced conclusive objections to the egoist

•
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thesis that there is no such thing as disinterested action.
Butler's arguments are of a logical and conceptual kind: we might ask
how such arguments can be relevant to questions that have now been assigned
to the domain of the scientific specialty of psychology, with its basis
in clinical experience and experiment.

Freud said, in the General Introduction

to Psycho-Analysis,
...you are not for a moment to suppose that the psycho¬
analytic point of view which I shall lay before you is a
speculative system of ideas. On the contrary, it is the
result of experience, being founded either on direct
observations or on conclusions drawn from observation.
Whether these have been drawn in an adequate or a justifiable
manner future advances in science will show....it was
particularly difficult, intense, and all-absorbing work that
yielded these observations.
I have often had the impression
that our opponents were unwilling to consider this source of
our statements, as if they looked upon them as ideas derived gg
subjectively which anyone could dispute at his own sweet will.
But in this passage Freud is speaking very much as a Baconian inductivist,
as discussed above, for whom the only alternatives are that a point of
view be "founded on direct observations or on conclusions drawn from
observation" or else "derived subjectively which anyone could dispute at
his own sweet will."^

At other times Freud was less inclined to minimize

the complexity of the process by which conclusions are drawn from
observation, as when he said later in the New Introductory Lectures,
The theory of instincts is so to say our mythology.
Instincts
are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness.
In our work we cannot for a moment disregard.them, yet we are
never sure that we are seeing them clearly.
A preliminary answer to the question of how the work of Butler and
other eighteenth century moral philosophers could be relevant to a dispute
among modern psychological theorists is that the dispute centrally involves
philosophical issues, in particular issues about how certain concepts are
to be understood.

The modern philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in his article
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"Egoism and Altruism"

72

has characterized the way in which he thinks

philosophical method and knowledge of the philosophical background are
applicable to current psychological discussions on the theory of human
motivation.

He refers in particular to certain Freudian notions as

belonging to "conceptual schemes which have already been encountered in
philosophy."

His discussion is worth quoting at some length, as it creates

the background for the arguments in the rest of this section:
The philosophers from Hobbes to Sidgwick who analyze the concepts
of egoism, altruism, and sympathy often write as if they were
empirical students of human nature, disputing the facts of
human action and motivation. But it is more illuminating to
read them as offering conceptual accounts of what it is to
have a good reason for action and of what the limits upon the
range of possible good reasons are.
But so closely allied are
conceptual and empirical issues at this point in the argument
that it is not surprising to find that the would-be empirical
accounts which psychologists claim to have derived from
observation should sometimes turn out to be a rendering of
conceptual schemes which have already been encountered in
philosophy.
So it is with Freud, most strikingly in his earlier
writings. The important place in Freudian theory held by the
pleasure principle, the concepts of gratification and libido,
and the consequent view of socialization all lead to a theory
in which the gratification of the self is primary and in which
altruism and benevolence are interpreted as secondary phenomena
which acquire the reagrd that they do because they are originally
associated with forms of self-gratification_There is, therefore,
not only the task of clarifying the concepts involved in these
accounts, but also the task of settling how far the issues
raised are genuinely empirical and how far genuinely
conceptual. The concepts in need of clarification are of five
kinds: the nature of desire; self-interest; altruism and
benevolence; motives, actions, and sympathies; and the
genetic fallacy.
Clarification of these concepts is what moral philosophy is largely
about, as philosophy of science is largely about "whether scientific ideas
do emerge from the facts."

Since it is philosophical egoism that Frankl

is most centrally attacking, consideration of Butler's similar response
to eighteenth century versions of the theory may help in understanding the

.
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issues involved.

In particular it will help to reveal some underlying

views of ours--inherited perhaps from eighteenth and nineteenth century
moral thought—that may play a part in maintaining the plausibility of
certain fallacious arguments by which philosophical egoism seems to be
supported.
The doctrine of philosophical egoism also sometimes called psychologi
egoism is remarkably difficult to define.

It can be held for many reasons,

based on many different kinds of arguments, and small differences in the
formulation of it may lead discussion down many different paths.
modern formulation of the doctrine, by

One

the moral philosopher Bernard

Harrison, is as follows:
Egoism is the doctrine that all men are wholly selfish
all the time; or that no man ever acts save for the sake of
some future state of his own (mental or physical) person.
Philosophical egoism must be recognized as a descriptive theory of human
motivation.

It purports to tell us what the range is of possible kinds of

motivation for human beings; it tells us, in contrast to some competing
theories, that this range is quite narrow.

The doctrine is not only

distinct from but logically incompatible with certain prescriptive egoistic
views that hold that people ought always to act in such a way as to
maximize their own pleasure or advantage.

According to philosophical

egoism this is the only way people ever act; there is no need to exhort
them to it.
This egoist principle is the principle Frankl is disputing, in
rejecting homeostasis theories.

He too is concerned most of all with

whether a psychological theory holds that it is for the sake of things and
people in the outer world or for the sake of states of his or her own being
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that a person acts.

This is evident, for example, in the passage quoted

above:
...If man were really driven to meaning...he would no longer
be really concerned with meaning itself but rather with his
own equilibrium and thus, in the final analysis, with himself.
Philosophical egoism entered English moral philosophy with Hobbes
and Mandeville in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Hobbes had

a profound influence on the work of the eighteenth century English moral
philosophers, perhaps most on those whose effort was devoted to refuting
him. The refutation evolved by Butler in his sermons on human nature is
considered by many twentieth century philosophers to have been successful.
However, they also tend to view the egoist philosophy as more influential
in the eighteenth century than it is now, and thus more in need of refuting.
In 1930 the English philosopher C. D. Broad noted the persistence of
philosophical egoism, in spite of what he considered conclusive arguments
brought by Butler against it.
It was...fashionable in Butler's time to deny the possibility
of disinterested action. This doctrine, which was a speculative
principle with Hobbes, has always had a certain vogue. It is not
without a certain superficial plausibility, and it has naturally
been popular both with vicious persons who wanted a philosophical
excuse for their own selfishness and with decent people who
felt slightly ashamed of their own virtues and wished to be
taken for men of the world. One of Butler's great merits is
to have pointed out clearly and conclusively the ambiguities
of language which make it plausible_In Butler's day the theory
moved in higher social and intellectual circles, and it had
to be treated more seriously than any philosopher would trouble
to treat it now. This change is very largely the result of
Butler's work; he killed the theory so thoroughly that he
sometimes seems to the modern reader to be flogging dead horses.
Still, all good fallacies go to America when they die, and rise
again as the latest discoveries of the local professors. So it
will always be useful to have Butler's refutation at hand.
Broad may have thought that Butler killed the theory, but Butler's
work is largely unknown outside circles of people with a specialized
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interest in eighteenth century intellectual history; and to the extent that
debate about human motivation has moved from philosophy to psychology, and
even biology, the whole tradition of previous discussion is commonly
disregarded.

Furthermore, what Butler actually addressed himself to

were certain assailable arguments for the theory, and these can in principle
be replaced by others.

Yet to the extent that those arguments still shape

assumptions about the nature of motivation and action, Butler's discussion
is indeed a valuable source to consult.
Before turning to Butler's arguments, I will attempt to convey something
of the general flavor of the egoistic theories of Mandeville and Hobbes with
a few examples.

Hobbes offered analyses of concepts such as pity and

charity entirely in terms of concern for one's own safety or power:
Pity is imagination of future calamity to our selves proceeding
from the sense of another man's Calamity.
But when it
lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the
compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more
probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil
that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man.
But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot
easily think will fall upon our selves, the pity is the less.
And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for,
whom they love, thevuthink worthy of good, and therefore not
worthy of calamity.7
There is yet another passion sometimes called Love, but more
properly good will or Charity. There can be no greater
argument, to a man, of his own power, then to find himself able
not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist
other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein
consisteth Charity.
In which, first, is contained that
natural affection of Parents to their Children...as also,
that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere
unto them.
But the affection wherewith men many times bestow
their benefits on strangers, is not to be called Charity, but 7R
either Contract, or Fear, which maketh them to purchase Peace.
Even laughter, not exactly an example from the conventional repertoire
of virtues, he construes as an expression of sudden awareness of one's own
superiority:
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I may therefore conclude, that the Passion of Laughter is nothing
else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of
some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity
of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies
of themselves past, when they come suddenly7to remembrance, except
they bring with them any present dishonour.'
Mandeville is similarly involved in the wholesale debunking of
conventional moral virtues, according to the unifying principle that
is at the root of all of them.

pride

"The moral virtues are the political

offspring which flattery begot upon pride."

His major work. The Fab!e

of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, is full of debunking
analyses of the various particular moral virtues.

But he also articulates

a view whereby all actions, regardless of their specific nature, can be
known to be selfish even without attributing them to a particular selfish
passion such as pride or love of power.
There is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready to drop
into the fire; the action is neither good nor bad, and what
benefit soever the infant received, we only obliged ourselves,
for to have seen it fall, and not strove to hinder it, would
have cauged a pain which self-preservation compelled us to
prevent.
...in the choice of things men must be determined by the perception
they have of happiness; and...no person can commit or set
about9an action which at the present time seems not best to
him.82
What all these examples have in common is that no evidence about
any specific individual is required to support the egoist claim.

Mandeville

is talking about anyone who rescues a child from the fire; this is different
from claiming to know enough about one particular incident to argue that,
for example, the rescuer actually did not care about the child and acted
only out of hope of reward or fear of recrimination.

As Harrison points

out, the universality of the egoist thesis suggests that there are some
logical claims behind it, and not just a disillusioning experience of

.
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the world.
People, especially young people, often accept this [egoist]
thesis with cheerful alacrity, as though it were an obvious
truism, or a piece of robust common sense. This ought to
astonish us, if we consider the incredible generality of the
egoist's claim.
Everyone, everywhere, all the time acts
selfishly? How could one possibly know? What conceivable
mode of empirical inquiry could establish a conclusion of such
summary and magesterial universality?
His answer to this question is that a logical proof of the position seems
to be available, and occurs readily even on hearing the egoist thesis for
the first time.

His account of this proof is as follows:

To say that somebody, _X, performed an action, a_, of his own
free will is to say that it pleased him to do it. But to
say that is to say that _X did a for the sake of the pleasure
which it gave him to do a_.
But the pleasure _X gets from doing
a_ is, obviously, a state of _X's mind.
It follows, therefore,
that _X does nothing save for the sake of future mental states
of his, or for the sake of future states of his body which
happen to beogecessary to the maintenance of the mental states
in question.
Alasdair MacIntyre gives another reconstruction of this argument, in which
the idea of motive and the idea of self-seeking motive are equated, on
what are supposed to be purely logical grounds:
How can any actual or possible object or state of affairs
provide me with a motive, appear to me as good or desirable,
unless it appears to be what will satisfy some desire of mine?
If the (necessary and sufficient) condition of an object's
providing me with a motive is that it satisfy some desire of
mine, then it will surely be the case that all my actions will
have as their goal the satisfaction of my desires. And to
seek only to satisfy my own desires is surely to have an
entirely self-seeking nature.
Thus the universality of the theory is supported, behind the abundance
of case-by-case efforts to give egoist accounts of conventional moral virtues,
by the universality of an a priori argument.

It is on this argument that

the discussion really depends, for case-by-case argument is bound to be
endless and inconclusive.

Each side can always come up with yet another

.
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example.

And, even more deeply problematic, it is exactly on the proper

characterization of the examples that egoists and anti-egoists will disagree.
If, for example, "pity" is analyzed according to Hobbes' definition, it
will be impossible, no matter how many instances of pity one could produce,
to produce one that an egoist would acknowledge as not representing fear
for oneself rather than concern for the other.

For what the anti-egoist

adduces as a demonstration of pity, the Hobbesian is prepared to understand,
by a priori principles, only in other terms.

That examples of apparently

generous, magnanimous, compassionate, courageous actions can be found is
not contested from an egoist position; the egoist claim is that these actions
are actually done for the sake of self.

Multiplying such examples can do

nothing but confirm each side in its opinion.

Frankl 's appeal to the observed

phenomena of moral life can be seen, in this light, as failing to appreciate
the radical nature of the egoist position.

The phenomena he adduces are in

conflict with egoism only from Frankl's point of view.
An a priori argument that seems to establish a substantive conclusion
about human nature seems immediately suspicious.

If it seems we can learn

from mere scrutiny of the concept of motivation that all motives are selfish,
it must be that we are scrutinizing a concept that already incorporates
this conclusion.

The argument amounts, that is, to fleshing out an egoist

conception of "motive" which identifies it with "self-seeking motive," on
the grounds that no one can be moved to action except by considerations of
selfish advantage.
to prove.

But this is exactly what the egoist theory is supposed

A persuasive and apparently logical sequence of ideas is

functioning here only as reiteration, not as argument.
The question hinges on what the implications are of saying that an
action "satisfies some desire of mine," and even more important, on what
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this does not mean.

It was to these issues that Butler addressed the

arguments in his sermons, recognizing that the tendency to accept an egoist
concept of motive had a basis in some profound confusions evident in the
language in which motivation was discussed.
Butler responds to Hobbes' definitions of pity and charity on two
levels.

His disputes at length the particular plausibility of each of the

two definitions; for example, he asks why, if charity is just love of power,
we can rejoice in the good fortune of another even when we ourselves did
not confer the benefit.
Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that
good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him;
and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person?
And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for
this desire or delight?5
And similarly

he argues that if Hobbes' definition of pity were adequate,

the most fearful men would be the most compassionate, and this is clearly
contrary to observation.
Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a fearful
and a compassionate man the same character, which every one
immediately sees are totally different.
But more powerful than any quarreling with the inadequacies of specific
definitions is Butler's recognition that these analyses are offered in the
service of a more general hypothesis, and that they owe to that hypothesis
a greater measure of plausibility than they might otherwise seem to
deserve.
Cautious of being deceived with outward show, he [Hobbes]
retires within himself to see exactly, what that is in the mind
of man from whence this appearance proceeds; and, upon deep
reflection, asserts the principle in the mind [of charity] to
be only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it.
Would not everybody think here was a mistake of one word for
another? that the philosopher was contemplating and accounting

.
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for some other human actions, some other behaviour of man to
man?...And could any one be thoroughly satisfied, that what is
commonly called benevolence or good-will was really the
affection meant, but only by being made to understand that this
learned person had at general hypothesis, to whj,gh the appearance
of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled?^ (my underlining)
It is to the general hypothesis rather than to specific examples that Butler
directs most of his discussion.
Butler's question for the egoist theorists is this: if actions are
undertaken solely for the sake of the pleasure they will give us, and are
apart from that of no intrinsic worth to the person performing them, from
whence will the pleasure come?

Why would it be pleasurable to have or

accomplish something I do not actually care about at all?
things can be desired as means to further ends.

Of course some

Butler's point is that if

everything is viewed as a means to some further end, and nothing as an end
in itself, the idea that we get pleasure at all out of these actions becomes
incoherent.
Yet nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage
a man hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular
friendships, or in any other, nothing, I say, is more common
than to hear such a question put in a way which supposes no
gain, advantage, or interest, but as a means to somewhat further:
and if so, then there is no such thing at all as real interest,
gain, or advantage. This is the same absurdity with respect
to life, as an infinite series of effects without a cause is
in speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest, consists in the
delight itself, arising from such a faculty's having its
object: neither is there any such thinagas happiness or
enjoyment, but what arises from hence.
Frankl made a related criticism from the empirical point of view, observing
that, in fact, direct pursuit of pleasure or happiness is self-defeating.
Butler is aware of this as well ("Surely that character we call selfish
is not the most promising for happiness."

) but he is also identifying a

self-defeating or self-contradictory structure in the egoist theory

.
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itself.
So if self-love wholly engrosses us and leaves no room for any
other principle there can be absolutely no such thing at all
as happiness, or enjoyment of any kind whatever, since happiness
consists in the gratification o|,particular passions, which
presupposes the having of them.
By particular passions Butler means desires for particular goals other than
pleasure or satisfaction itself.

Sometimes he creates confusion by calling

these "external" objects, but from other aspects of his argument as well
as from examples such as that of a course of study, given in the quotation
above, it seems fairly clear that what he means by "external" is "external
to self-interest as such."

92

Besides, the very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily
presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very
idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an
appetite or affection enjoys its object. It is not because we
love ourselves that we find delight in such and such objects,
but because we have particular affections towards them. Take
away these affections and you leave self-love absolutely nothing
at all to employ itself about; no end or object for it to
pursue, except only that of avoiding pain.
This last phrase, "except only that of avoiding pain," proves to
be important.

For in effect homeostasis theories of motivation postulate

exactly this, that there is indeed no end or object being pursued except
as a means to the reduction of unpleasant tension--that is, pain.

Butler's

arguments, we must acknowledge, in no way constitute a disproof of such a
homeostasis theory.

As Butler says.

Indeed the Epicureans, who maintained that absence of pain
was the highest happiness, might, consistently with themselves,
deny all affection, and if they had so pleased, every sensual
appetite too: but the very idea of interest or happiness other
than absence of pain, implies particular appetites or passions;q.
these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness.
To say "you enjoy music only for the sake of the pleasure it gives you"
would be, following Butler's logic, incoherent; but "music happens to relieve

■
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a certain painful state in you" is not.

The contribution of Butler's point

here is that the first of these formulations shares in the superficial
plausibility of the egoist theory as a whole, and might seem to need no
justifying.

The second at least presents a much more specific hypothesis,

and one which as Butler says himself is not subject to the criticism that it
postulates an endless chain of causes.
The second, and even more important, contribution Butler makes to the
discussion of philosophical egoism is in pointing out that not one but two
different kinds of selfishness are actually being discussed. The first, and
stronger, egoist thesis is that the true content of all desires is selfish
in the familiar, colloquial sense: my concerns are all ultimately with
having things (including intangible things like power, fame, admiration)
for myself.
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Hobbes's discussions of pity and charity are in this category.

The second and weaker thesis is that all desires whatever their content are
selfish simply by virtue of being desires. I will refer to this sense of
"selfish" as the weak, or formal, sense.
For "selfish" in the stronger sense Butler often uses the term
"interested" (meaning self-interested).

Particular desires which are

selfish only in the weaker, or formal, sense that they belong to the agent,
may range from benevolent to malicious; they may be compatible with long¬
term self-interest or mildly or ruinously self-destructive.

The weaker sense

of selfish, in other words, is compatible with actions of all possible types,
and certainly implies no necessarily selfish character in the stronger sense.
For the sake of making this point particularly clear Butler calls all
specific desires "disinterested," though "not-necessarily-interested" might
be a less confusing term.

Butler himself points out that the choice of terms

.
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is not important. What is important is distinguishing between the two
different senses of "selfish" and recognizing that only one of them applies
to all desires in a tautological fashion.

And this is the one not strong

enough to establish the egoist claim that no concern except with oneself
is real. Butler summarizes his own argument very incisively in the preface
to his published sermons; it is quoted here at length

to build up a sense

of how he uses his own terms in context, and because it presents the essentials
of the argument so concisely:
The chief design of the eleventh Discourse is to state the
notion of self-love and disinterestedness, in order to show
that benevolence is not more unfriendly to self-love, than any
other particular affection whatever. There is a strange
affectation in many people of explaining away all particular
affections, and representing the whole life as nothing but
one continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that
surprising confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans of old,
Hobbes, the author of Reflexions, Sentences, et Maximes Morales,
and this whole set of writers; the confusion of calling actions
interested which are done in contradiction to the most manifest
known interest, merely for the gratification of a present passion.
Now all this confusion might easily be avoided by stating to
ourselves wherein the idea of self-love in general consists, as
distinguished from all particular movements towards particular
external objects; the appetites of sense, resentment, compassion,
curiosity, ambition, and the rest. When this is done, if the
words selfish and interested cannot be parted with, but must be
applied to everything; yet, to avoid such total confusion of all
language, let the distinction be made by epithets: and the first
may be called cool or settled selfishness, and the other passionate
or sensual selfishness. But the most natural way of speaking
plainly is, to call the first only, self-love, and the actions
proceeding from it, interested: and to say of the latter, that
they are not love to ourselves, but movements towards somewhat
external: honour, power, the harm or good of another: and that the
pursuit of these external objects, so far as it proceeds from these
movements, (for it may proceed from self-love) is no otherwise
interested, than as every action of every creature must, from
the nature of the thing, be; for no one can act but from a
desire, or choice, or preference of his own.
The emphasis on language is crucial here.

If "selfish" and "interested"

are to be applied to all actions, different terms must be found to distinguish

.

the particular type of action that these terms were formerly used to single
out.

A distinction itself has not disappeared when the language for making

it is taken away.

Restating Butler's argument, we could say he is pointing

out that "selfish" in the weak or formal sense ("for no one can act but
from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own") is being substituted
for "selfish" in the strong or substantive sense, in constructing the egoist
argument. A fallacy results from establishing this substitution and then
reversing it after certain logical relationships have been established. The
fallacy works as follows: 1) Selfishness (weak sense) is inherent in all
actions and motives as such.

2) All actions are selfish (still the weak

sense) by definition, thus on a priori or logical grounds. 3) All actions
are selfish (now substituting the strong sense) on a priori or logical
grounds.

It is striking that Butler himself, in the passage just quoted,

describes this type of thinking as "explaining away all particular affections,
and representing the whole life as nothing but one continued exercise of
self-love," for it is precisely an instance of reductionism of the explainingaway variety, as discussed above, that he has identified.
Butler's point is ultimately simple, as the error in this line of
reasoning is simple; but it is elusive until it is recognized. Butler
responds to the a priori egoist argument with the observation that saying that
the accomplishment of my desires will satisfy me is not the same as saying
that my own satisfaction must be the true goal of my action. The first is a
statement about how the concept of desire is

used, and so is indeed true by

tautology or definition. The second is the egoist thesis—a very different,
and substantive, claim.
fulfilled.

A desire is said to be "satisfied" when it is

This would be true of any desire.

It is not a unique

’
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characteristic of a desire for "satisfaction" itself. Indeed, it is not clear
that this last notion makes any sense, unless the notion of "pleasure," with
its additional sensual connotations, is carelessly substituted for "satisfaction,
as it often is in these arguments.

We have returned to the point made by

Butler and Frankl that satisfaction presupposes at least some other aims, unless
it consists entirely of avoidance of pain.
To say that any desire necessarily involves a desire for its own
satisfaction seems to be a clumsy and pedantic, but intelligible, way of
expanding on what "desire" as a concept involves.

Saying that any desire is

necessarily a desire for a certain experience, namely "satisfaction," can be
derived from this only by a semantic confusion that is essentially nothing
more than a play on words.

And finally, since this experience of satisfaction

is my experience, the egoist conclusion is drawn that my actions always have
as their goal states of my own being.

By this path, as Austin Duncan-

Jones suggests in his book on Butler, the egoist position acquires a
misleading atmosphere of being necessarily true, which it does not deserve.
The theory of universal selfishness, known as psychological
egoism, and in one of its forms as psychological hedonism,
seems to have a perennial life. It has often been refuted by
philosophers, and Butler's is the classic refutation of it. Yet
it flourishes still, and is felt by many people to have the force
of an axiom, whose denial is absurd. There is no doubt that,
as Butler made plain, its plausibility rests partly on confusions
about the meanings of words. 7 (my underlining)
He summarizes the problems in the egoist argument, as elaborated above,
as follows:
In short, the generalization that al1 my actions spring from
my desires or motives proves to be a disguised tautology,
which must be true, given the accepted meaning of the word
"action." And this tautology cannot support the conclusion
that all my performances spring from selfish motives.
It is important to note that these considerations, however far they

.

-
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thesis, do not amount to a disproof of that thesis.

The validity of a

position such as philosophical egoism and the validity of any particular
arguments used in supporting it must be considered separately.

All that has

been shown is that one of the lines of argument supporting the egoist view-and arguably the most influential, because it supports all the case-by-case
discussion--is not tenable.

Philosophical egoism is left as a thesis that

could be valid, but whose denial cannot be considered absurd.

And this is

important because, as Butler said, many apparently more empirical arguments,
such as the egoist analyses of specific moral concepts as presented by
Mandeville and Hobbes, are covertly dependent o

the a priori argument.

Many of their specific analyses would seem strained and unconvincing without
the backing of the general argument, requiring the acceptance of some kind of
egoist explanation.

In effect, when the flaws in the general argument are

understood, it becomes apparent that many of the examples are being made to
fit the theory, rather than supplying it with independent support.
Butler himself does not claim that purely disinterested action,
whether helpful, harmful or neutral, in its effects on other people, is
very common.
Self-love and any particular passion may be joined together;
and from this complication, it becomes impossible in numberless
instances to determine precisely, how far an action, perhaps
even of one's own, has for its principle general self-love, or
some particular passion.
And as Harrison points out, when it comes to constructing a positive theory
of his own, Butler makes curiously cautious use of his powerful arguments
against philosophical egoism.

For self-interest, or what Butler calls in

his system "cool self-love," functions in his system as a "regulating
principle" along with conscience.

As a regulating principle, self-love

■
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makes no qualitative distinctions among the particular desires; it seeks a
numerical maximum of gratified individual desires (though Butler sometimes
talks as if he considers self-love to have direct aims of its own, as well).
Butler makes the assumption that aims that are anti-social and selfish in
the strong sense will be less compatible with other desires than benevolent
ones will be, so that an identity between the dictates of conscience and those
of self-love is assured.
Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness,
always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly
coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and
in every instance if we take in the future, and the whole;
this being.implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration
of things.iUU
This assumption allows Butler to make his paradoxical sounding claim that
the problem in moral life is not that people have too much self-love, but
that they have too little.^1 Hence they gratify their particular passions
unwisely, producing harm to themselves and others.
Harrison contends that Butler ends up granting to self-interest a
role almost as great as the egoist view would require:
What happens in Butler's theorising is, in effect, that egoism,
ejected through the front door by a series of quite serious
and impressive arguments, creeps in again by the back in the
respectable guise of a 'rational principle of ordering' and is
in this guise comfortably recommended as a principle scarcely
different in its effect from virtue; while virtue, by the same
token, is made to appear as the prudent man's surest road to
the maximal satisfaction of his desires.
Yet Butler has still successfully dismantled the flawed logical argument
that would seem to compel people to the egoist view.

Furthermore, if he

is somewhat complacent in the belief that self-interest and conscience will
never conflict, he has nonetheless shown that the common assumption that they
necessarily conflict is based on construing all desire as selfish in the
substantive sense.
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V.

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY: CONTENT AND PROCESS

To moral philosophers, deciding what actions, if any, deserve to be
called "moral" is an important concern.

To varying extents, depending on

the particular philosopher, this involves scrutiny of the motives of an
action as a basis for making this decision.

Perhaps the most extreme

example of such an approach was that of Kant, who considered only those
actions to be moral that are done solely

for the sake of obeying the moral

law, although he admitted that there were grave questions about whether any
such actions could exist and how they would be recognized.
To modern psychological theorists the question of assigning moral
value to actions has lost its urgency; indeed, it may be felt that any
such enterprise would conflict with the goals of theory and therapy alike.
This attitude is exemplified by the statement Frank! quotes with approval
from Paul Valery: "Si nous jugeons et accusons, le fonds n'est pas atteint."
("As long as we judge and accuse, we do not get to the bottom of things.")

103

Nor is a modern psychologist likely to be interested in assigning an overall
evaluation to "human nature" in terms of ultimate good or evil.

Where then

is the interest, from this point of view, in assessing the claims of the
philosophical egoist's position?
We are interested in characterizing and discovering motives, if not
in judging them, to the extent that they are considered to be far from
self-evident. Freud established in psychology the notion that a person
does not have adequate conscious knowledge of his or her motives. As he
said,
...Man's craving for grandiosity is now suffering the third
and most bitter blow brom present-day psychological research
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which is endeavouring to prove to the "ego" of each one of us
that he is not even master in his own house, but that he must
remain content with the veriest scraps of information about what
is going on unconsciously in his own mind. We psychoanalysts were
neither the first nor the only ones to propose to mankind that
they should look inward; but it appears to be our lot to
advocate it most insistently and to support.it by empirical
evidence which touches every man closely.
Hence we are looking, at least in part, for motives which are hidden.
is a powerful notion.

This

It allows a great deal of scope for our underlying

ideas about the nature of motivation and the types of things people desire
to affect what hidden motives we will find.
Theories such as that of philosophical egoism have a bearing on our
expectations about how we will recognize the true, non-obvious motives
when we find them.

If we are convinced in advance of the truth of an

egoist view, we will reject appeals to non-egoist motivations uniformly as
failing to supply a "real" explanation.
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The argument over philosophical

egoism is part of an argument over what kinds of motives should be
recognized as "real."

In the case of Freud, egoist assumptions enter

through his theories about why these hidden motives are not available
to consciousness; he regards the repressed desires as having a selfish,
instinctual character that makes them unacceptable to consciousness.

If

on his view it is because of their threateningly amoral character that
certain desires are not allowed to remain or become conscious, then
inevitably when he looks for repressed desires they will be of this kind.
This is not to say that Freud's ideas about why the desires are repressed
necessarily preceded or shaped his ideas about what kinds of desires they
are.

However, it is clear that these ideas have to be challenged together

and depend, in part, on each other.

.
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It is in relation to this question of where the search for hidden
motives should stop that Frankl's chief criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis
can, finally, be framed.

As Frank! says,

All of us have learned the lesson of the greatest spirit in
psychotherapy, Sigmund Freud. I, too! ...He has taught us
to unmask the neurotic, to reveal the hidden, unconscious
motivations underlying his behavior. However, as I never
tire of saying, unmasking has to stop at the point where the
psychoanalyst is confronted wit^ghat can no longer be unmasked,
simply because it is authentic.
Among the most important motives which Frankl contends are excluded from
serious consideration in psychoanalytic theory are those involving what he
has called the noetic realm or the noological dimension; this is the realm
of intellectual, artistic, moral and religious concerns, and above all of
self-awareness and self-determination.
Man passes [into] the noological dimension whenever he is
reflecting upon himself--or, if need be, rejecting himself;
whenever he is making himself an object--or making objections
to himself; whenever he displays his being conscious of himself-or whenever he exhibits his being conscientious. In fact, being
conscientious presupposes the uniquely human capacity to rise
above oneself, to judge and evaluate one's own deeds in moral
and ethical terms.
What then is man? We ask again. He is a being who continuously
decides what he is: a being who equally harbors the potential
to descend tflothe level of an animal or to ascend to the life
of a saint.
The noetic is the realm of meaning, which is created in devotion to purposes
beyond oneself, in real involvement with other people and the world.

For

Frankl a theory that neglects this aspect has left out, not just one factor,
but the most important one; as he quotes from Nietzsche, "He who knows a
'why' for living, will surmount almost every 'how.'"

109

In a therapeutic context, a reductionistic conceptual scheme,
whatever the heuristic value of its simplifications, must be clearly

••
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recognized as such.

The type of causality it postulates must not be taken

to justify pan-determinism.

For pan-determinism is, at the very least,

of no use to a person confronting difficult choices about what to do and
how to understand his or her history.

Freedom and responsibility are for

Frank! primary features of human life, not to be explained away.

Here his

appeal to the phenomena seems justified; it reminds us that the burden of
proof is on the people who would systematically deny that these well-known
experiences are possible or viridical.
Human existence is, in its essence, noetic. A human being is
not one thing among others: Things are determining each other,
but man is self-determining. In actuality, man is free and
responsible, and these constituents of his spirituality,
i.e., freedom and responsibility, must never be clouded by ..g
what is called the reification or depersonalization of man.
Since noological concerns are characterized for Frankl precisely
by their conscious character (though he allows they can be unconscious as
well, especially in people whose ideology prevents their recognition), it
is important to his position to maintain that some "authentic" motivations
may not be hidden at all.
Freud never took a human phenomenon at its face value; or,
to adopt the formulation used by Gordon W. All port,
"Freud was a specialist in precisely those motives that
cannot be taken at their face value." Does this, however,
imply that there are,no motives at all which should be taken
at their face value?1
And finally, the reason all this is so important clinically, he says, is
that increasingly patients will come to psychiatrists and psychotherapists
with questions about the meaning of life that they might once have presented
to a priest, minister, rabbi or other religious counselor. It is extremely
important that these "noogenic" problems, when present, be recognized by
the therapist for what they are and addressed without an automatic reduction

•
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to the psychodynamic, or biological level.

To therapy that addresses these

concerns on their own terms, where that is appropriate, Frankl gives the
name of "logotherapy"; as he says it is characterized by an orientation
toward recognizing the validity--and the limitations—of all the different
ways of conceptualizing experience, more than it represents a specific
clinical approach:
We think of logotherapy as a supplement rather than a
substitute for psychotherapy in the narrow sense of the word.
But in addition, logotherapy might also make a contribution
toward the completion of psychotherapy's picture of man, toward
a picture of man in all his dimensions, toward a picture that
also includes the genuinely human, that is, the noological
dimension.
If psychotherapy is to remain therapy and not become a
symptom within the pathology of the time (Zeitgeist), then
it needs a correct picture of man; it.needs this at least as
much as it needs an exact technique.
This can be taken in two different ways, as I elaborated in the previous
discussion (Section II) of how Frankl construes the role of philosophy in
psychology.

"A correct picture of man" sometimes seems to mean his picture

of man, presented just as uncritically as any of the limited theories he
criticizes.

But in a

deeper way, "a correct picture of man" refers to a

picture that is not dogmatically bounded by what we think we understand of
human emotion, thought and action. Biological and psychodynamic theories
must be recognized as theories whose power is in their generality. As Frankl
says, the meaning of life is individual; no one can tell another person
what it is for him or her.

And the clinician dealing with an individual

patient is working, at least in part, with individual meanings of this
kind, that broad unifying theories were

not desiqned to elucidate. "A correct

picture of man" is not in this sense a static or uniquely specified concept;
it is shaped by the exercise of philosophical reflection on the nature of

'

if

59

one's intellectual tools, and on sustained awareness of the relative modesty
of what one can expect from them.
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CONCLUSION

I have tried to show how Frank!'s recognition of unacknowledged
philosophical dimensions involved in metapsychology and in psychotherapy
can be enriched by consideration of the philosophical context.

In the case

of his rejection of a Baconian conception of psychology as a scientific
activity free of untestable assumptions, the relevant context is the recent
debate in philosophy of science

over the "theory-laden" character of all

observation. In the case of his objections to particular assumptions he
finds shaping modern psychological theory--of which the Freudian pleasure
principle is by far the most important--I have argued that it is the
doctrine in moral philosophy called philosophical egoism, rather than the
pleasure principle as such, that Frankl is really questioning.

And since

he simply rejects philosophical egoism as if its unacceptability were selfevident, I have explored the specific arguments brought against the theory
by Bishop Butler in the eighteenth century.

This yielded the conclusion that

one very persuasive and important a priori argument for that theory is based
on a fallacy supported, as Butler beautifully demonstrated, by confusions about
language. But it could not be concluded that Butler had refuted the

theory

of egoism itself, only that his arguments leave it without any strong claim
to plausibility. Like extreme scepticism of any form, it probably cannot be
formally refuted.

Finally, I have suggested that the clinical search for

underlying non-obvious or unconscious motives has a point of intersection
with the tradition of moral philosophy.

For philosophical theories such

as philosophical egoism may shape assumptions about where the search for
explanation should stop.

It is therefore important to articulate such

theories, and to be aware of their influence and of the arguments that have
been made over time concerning their logical status.
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that they seem from it to have formed a general way of thinking, which they
apply to other things that they have nothing to do with." Ibid., Sermon XI,
p. 257.
96Ibid., Preface, pp. 69-71.
97

Austin Duncan-Jones, Butler's Moral Philosophy, p. 95.

98Ibid., p. 97.
99

Butler, Ethical Discourses, Preface, p. 71.

1Q0Ibid., Sermon III, p. 122.
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101,,The thing to be lamented is, not that men have so great regard
to their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not
enough; but that they have so little to the good of others." Ibid., Preface,
p. 73.
^Harrison, Fielding's Tom Jones, p. 87. Harrison cites Fielding's
reply to Butler and other eighteenth century moral philosophers who
saw too easy an accord between the impulses of virtue and prudence:
"There are a set of religious, or rather moral writers, who teach that
virtue is the certain road to happiness and vice to misery, in this world.
A very wholesome and conformable doctrine, and to which we have but one
objection, namely, that it is not true." p. 120.
103

Frankl, "In Memoriam," in Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 111.
My translation.
■^Freud, General Introduction, p. 252.
105

Frankl supplies a modern example, an account of an incident in the
training of some Peace Corps volunteers, illustrating what he calls the
reductionist interpretation of values: "At the outset they had had to
participate in mandatory group sessions led by a psychologist who played
a game somewhat as follows: 'Why did you join the Peace Corps?' 'We wanted
to help people less privileged.' 'So you must be superior to them.' 'In a
way.' 'So there must be in you, in your unconscious, a need to prove to
yourself that you are superior.' 'Well, we never thought of it that way,
but you are a psychologist, you certainly know better.' And so it went on.
They were indoctrinated in the interpretation of their idealism and altruism
as mere personal hang-ups. Even worse, they were constantly on each other's
backs, playing the 'what's your hidden motive game,' according to their
report." The Unconscious God, p. 94.
^Viktor E. Frankl, The Unheard Cry for Meaning, p. 14.
^Frankl s The Wi 11 to Meaning, p. 18.
108

Frankl, "In Memoriam," in Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 110.

109

Frankl, "Group Psychotherapeutic Experiences in a Concentration
Camp," p. 103.
^viktor E. Frankl, "Dynamics and Values," in Psychotherapy and
Existential ism, p. 63.
^Frankl, "The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy," p. 7.
112

Frankl, "Existential Analysis and Dimensional Ontology," in
Psychotherapy and Existential ism, p. 142.
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